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Shifts in Modes of Governance and Sustainable Development in the Brazilian Oil Sector  
 
Highlights 
 
• We analyse shifts in modes of governance using the case of the Brazilian oil sector. 
• Shifts on modes of governance were driven by actors, institutional and policy features 
changes.  
• We examine the impacts of modes of governance on sustainable development.  
• Recent mode of governance contradicts relevant aspects of sustainable development. 
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Shifts in Modes of Governance and Sustainable Development in the Brazilian Oil Sector 
 
This article discusses shifts in modes of governance in the Brazilian oil sector over a 60-year 
period. On the basis of Driessen et al.’s (2012) framework, we discuss the impact of these 
shifts on sustainable development. Our results suggest that changes in modes of governance 
were driven by regulation and mostly associated with shifts in both actors and institutional 
features but that the underlying rationale of prioritising economic outcomes remained 
unaffected. The results also confirm that a central governance structure remained in place 
over time and co-existed in different modes of governance. Petrobras was the backbone of 
this structure and instrumental in empowering and disempowering non-state actors. This 
article stresses that a mode of governance furthering sustainable development should 
promote interactions of large numbers of actors and may require active participation of 
Petrobras to encourage rationales that support improvements in social and environmental 
domains. 
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Introduction 
The oil sector has been considered a ‘controversial industry’ because some of its business 
practices can cause a negative impact on economic, social and environmental dimensions 
(Cumbers, 2000; De Roeck & Delobbe, 2012). Examples of negative consequences related to 
the oil sector are global climate change, impacts on biodiversity, deterioration of air and 
water quality, and the ‘resource curse’ (Du & Vieira, 2012). Thus, achieving sustainable 
development in the oil sector is a challenge (Escobar & Vredenburg, 2011).  
 
Companies acting in the oil sector are mostly large multinational corporations (MNCs) that 
operate in different parts of the world through subsidiaries. Although the oil sector is under 
constant social pressure, any changes in business practices seem to be related to host country 
interpretations of sustainable development (Cumbers, 2000; Escobar & Vredenburg, 2011). 
The literature stresses that the absence of integration between MNCs and governance at the 
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macro level can contribute to failures in solutions furthering sustainable development1 
(Heuer, 2012; Idahosa, 2002; Idemudia, 2009; Ketola, 2006; Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 2002).  
 
Our research aims to contribute to the debate on the existing conflict between economic 
growth and sustainable development by analysing changes in modes of governance in the 
Brazilian oil sector. This paper gives special attention to the role that Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. 
(Petrobras) 2 has played in supporting changes in governance in Brazil. We take this approach 
because of Petrobras’s shared public–private ownership, enabling the government’s influence 
on the oil sector. In 2007, Petrobras announced the discovery of the largest oil deposits in the 
world, formally named ‘pre-salt’ (Petrobras, 2006, 2007). The pre-salt oil discovery has 
triggered interest in researching the effects of oil sector activities on sustainable 
development3.  
 
Our research adds to the above literature by pursuing two main objectives. First, our study 
aims to outline the impacts of change in modes of governance on sustainable development, 
considering the Brazilian oil sector. A special emphasis is placed on understanding what 
forms of governance lead to (un)sustainable4 impacts caused by oil sector operations and the 
role of Petrobras in these impacts. Polette and Seabra (2013) analysed issues related to 
sustainability and governance; however, this article does not include the analysis of the 
influence that Petrobras may have had on sustainability matters. This is a relevant aspect to 
study because Petrobras is a state-owned organisation and has acted as a facilitator of the 
implementation of governmental policies in the oil sector in recent years. This contribution 
also differs from that of Paz (2015), which concentrated on analysing how institutions 
influenced Petrobras to sustain financial performance over time. Second, our research aims to 
identify changes in modes of governance considering the Brazilian oil sector using a 
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framework proposed by Driessen et al. (2012). This framework allows for the analysis of how 
a variety of actors, institutional features and policies can influence shifts in power and, in 
turn, influence modes of governance5. Polette and Seabra (2013) concentrated mainly on 
discussing governance in the pre-salt period and as a result did not include a longitudinal 
analysis of modes of governance and why/how features evolve to influence changes that may 
lead to (un)sustainable practices. Moreover, this article adds to Ribeiro & Novaes’ (2016) 
research by analysing changes in modes of governance towards a sustainable development 
approach. 
 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. This article starts by providing an 
overview of modes of governance as applied to sustainable development. The following 
section explains the research methods used in this study. This paper continues by including 
an analysis of shifts in modes of governance from 1953 to 2013. It also relates the changes in 
modes of governance in the Brazilian oil sector and their impact on sustainable development. 
Finally, the last section provides a final discussion and conclusions. 
 
Modes of Governance: A Sustainability Approach 
 
The literature notes that there is no clear and mature interpretation of the meaning of 
sustainable development (Kemp, et al., 2005). Thus, for the context of this study, we will 
work with notions of sustainability that call for global justice and human development6 within 
a fragile natural environment that must be preserved (Lange, et al., 2013). Notions of 
sustainable development require social transformation, long-term perspectives, and 
multidimensional objectives (Lange, et al., 2013). Thus, it is claimed that sustainable 
development cannot be achieved without changes in governance. The nature of sustainable 
development is complex, involving the collective action of different stakeholders (van Zeijl-
Rozema, Cörvers, Kemp, & Martens, 2008) over an array of environmental and social issues 
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utilising a long-term perspective (Hysing, 2009, 2010; Lange, et al., 2013). Analysis of 
modes of governance can help in making decisions furthering sustainable development, in the 
sense that it allows a search for political structures that establish a common approach by 
different actors (Berger, 2003) in different economic sectors with the objective of achieving 
collective goals (Berger, 2003; Hysing, 2009, 2010; Kemp, et al., 2005; van de Meene, et al., 
2011; Weber, Driessen, & Runhaar, 2011). A detailed analysis of changes in modes of 
governance can entail the identification of features that encourage high levels of transparency 
and accountability, allowing broader societal integration and, consequently, less hierarchical 
structures (Lange, et al., 2013). 
 
The literature also sought to characterise dimensions that describe different modes of 
governance to illustrate the application of the above-mentioned pre-requisites (Hysing, 2009, 
2010; van de Meene, et al., 2011; Weber, et al., 2011). In particular, Lange, et al. (2013) 
suggested that an analysis of changing on modes of governance (furthering sustainable 
development) should include three dimensions (Lange, et al., 2013): (i) political process 
(politics), (ii) institutional structures (polity) and (iii) policy contexts (policy). Politics refers 
to the types of actors (e.g. public and private) and how these actors interact in different 
governance modes. Polity provides an analysis of how interactions are built, reflecting on the 
structure of governance and rules in place. Policy concentrates on the types of policy enacted 
and their formulation, content and implementation.  
 
Lange, et al. (2013) analysed different types of frameworks and concluded that frameworks 
do not always address politics, polity and policy. Moreover, Lange, et al. (2013) identified 
the framework suggested by Driessen, et al. (2012) as that which included these three 
necessary dimensions (politics, polity, and policy). Thus, our research uses the framework on 
shifts in modes of governance, suggested by Driessen, et al. (2012), as a lens to answer the 
following research questions7. 
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RQ1: What drove shifts in modes of governance over time in the Brazilian oil sector?  
RQ2: Did shifts in modes of governance in the Brazilian oil sector contribute to sustainable 
development? 
 
These questions are relevant because although debates on shifts in modes of governance have 
evolved over the years, the possibility of explaining the changes is still considered a gap to be 
addressed in this field (Rhodes, 2007). Additionally, the literature emphasises not only the 
importance of practical studies to understand when, how and why shifts in modes of 
governance occur (Lange, et al., 2013) but also the relevance of research focusing on specific 
sectors, such as the Brazilian oil sector (Driessen, et al., 2012).  
 
The case of the Brazilian oil sector can be considered unique. This is because in recent 
decades, most Latin American countries have implemented changes in their oil sector 
governance by moving from a nationalist approach towards a system that incentivises foreign 
investment (Monaldi, 2014). Brazil took a different perspective and adopted a ‘milder form 
of resource nationalism’ in which the government increased its participation in contracts with 
foreign companies and changed parameters to distribute rents from the sector (Monaldi, 2014, 
p. 4). Petrobras (multinational state-owned oil company and leader in promoting Latin 
America’s energy integration) was instrumental in the implementation of this particular 
approach, which has shown a lack of investments on energy integration, little expansion of oil 
exploration and production abroad (Calich, Weber, Closs, & Roberto, 2014; Monaldi, 2014), 
and corruption (Ribeiro & Novaes, 2016). In the Brazilian case, policy can be identified as 
the main driver of changes in governance to address issues related to market forces. 
Understanding the impact of these features on actors and institutions is helpful to identify 
causes of (un)sustainable practices and reflect on possible methods of improvement. 
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The framework proposed by Driessen, et al. (2012) (‘the framework’ hereafter, see appendix) 
is instrumental to understanding the Brazilian context because it includes aspects of political 
processes, institutional structures and policy content (Lange, et al., 2013). The framework 
considers five different governance arrangements 8 : centralised governance (the central 
government is in charge), decentralised governance (power is distributed within local 
government), public–private governance (the market and the government work hand in hand), 
interactive governance (there is equal collaboration between the government, market and civil 
society) and self-governance (private initiatives). These interactions are considered non-
linear, and they could vary through a combination of three features: actors, institutions and 
policy. Driessen, et al. (2012) listed different topics to be considered when describing these 
governance arrangements. Narrative research involving these features over a period of time 
will provide the basis to analyse groups’ abilities to create meanings to support changes and 
sustain patterns.  
 
For example, to position a mode of governance according to its actors’ features, an analysis 
should include characteristics in the following categories: key public actors (relationship 
among the state, market and civil society), the position of other stakeholders (this could vary 
between governance dictated by the central authority and self-governing), the policy level at 
which actors operate (e.g. national and international) and the basis of power of key actors 
(e.g. authoritative as opposed to autonomy). The aspects used to describe institutional 
features are as follows: the model of representation of actors (e.g. elections), the type of rules 
used for interaction (e.g. formal as opposed to informal) and the mechanisms in place for 
social interaction (e.g. top down as opposed to bottom up). Finally, the following aspects are 
used to describe the features concerning policy: types of goals in place (e.g. uniform as 
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opposed to tailor-made), policy instruments used (e.g. legislation and voluntary instruments), 
type of knowledge used for policy preparation (e.g. generic knowledge as opposed to an 
expert) and the level of policy integration (e.g. segregated and integrated sectors).  
 
An important limitation of this framework is the simplification of complex social structures 
that exist in the real world (Lange, et al., 2013). Thus, features of each mode of governance 
should be interpreted with caution. However, the framework allows benchmarking of modes 
of governance at the meta level and compilation of data over long periods of time (Lange, et 
al., 2013). This is an advantage of this framework because the main objective of this study is 
to identify the direction and intensity of different shifts in modes of governance driven by 
regulations to promote sustainable development, considering a 60-year time horizon. 
 
Research Methods 
This is a narrative research that aims to elicit the causal explanation underlying the changes 
in the arrangement of governance in the Brazilian oil sector (Berg, 2004; Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2010). This narrative is presented chronologically from 1953 to 2013 (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen, 2010). The study uses archival data to address the research questions. Data 
was collected from four9 main sources10: (i) the laws that were the basis for the construction 
of the new regulatory framework for pre-salt oil exploration (from 1953 to 2013), (ii) 
environmental and sustainability reports produced by Petrobras, (iii) the former president 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s 2009 speech illustrating the benefits of the pre-salt oil exploration 
in the country11 and (iv) the 2012 Brazilian national energy balance and report from the 
Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum and Biofuels (Table 1).  
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The data are analysed using a deductive thematic approach12 (Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004) based on the framework proposed by Driessen, et al. (2012) to structure a 
narrative (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2010) on shifts in modes of governance furthering 
sustainable development. This narrative was also built to highlight dilemmas created and 
patterns sustained by actors over the time. To develop the plot of this narrative, segments 
from archival data were organised into a sequential timeline matrix (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). A summarised version of this matrix is presented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Data analysis was conducted in four different stages by two coders, both authors of the paper. 
In the first stage, the first coder collected relevant regulations on the Brazilian oil sector and 
identified three significant changes in them. In the second stage, the first coder collected 
supplementary archival data (e.g. reports produced by public and private Brazilian 
institutions) to identify main institutions and actors linked to these regulations and their 
impact on sustainable development. The second coder conducted the third stage with the aim 
of compiling and organising the information collected. At this stage, the framework was 
applied to give a structure to the information collected within an explanatory longitudinal 
scheme involving changes in modes of governance, policy, institutions and actors. Finally, 
during the fourth stage, the first coder cross-checked the analysis conducted by the second 
coder, and differences were discussed. After discussing the differences and consulting 
academic literature on specific topics, discrepancies were amended to reflect the agreed-upon 
results. There were a small number of discrepancies, and these disagreements were mostly to 
rearrange the data in a more clear and detailed manner. 
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The analysis involves a 60-year period because this is a reasonable time frame to understand 
relevant changes in modes of governance in the Brazilian oil sector. This is because 
significant changes in modes of governance only began after a 40-year period under 
monopoly mode, and these changes were highly influenced by policy reforms (Ribeiro & 
Novaes, 2016, Assis & Araújo, 2011). An important advantage of the archival analysis is the 
possibility of compiling large amounts of information that can be difficult to explore using 
other research methods (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2010). Archival analysis also allows the 
scrutiny of historical records within a longitudinal perspective. However, archival analysis 
also presents limitations. For example, it may be difficult to cover all the existing material on 
a specific topic (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2010). Additionally, the volume of information 
available may present a challenge for organising the data in a structured manner that allows 
logical inferences (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2010). To reduce these limitations, the authors 
narrowed the time scale and used a framework accepted in the literature to provide a reliable 
interpretation of the data collected within the boundaries of a coding scheme. 
  
The Brazilian Oil Sector Context 
This section uses a framework to describe shifts in modes of governance in the oil sector in 
Brazil. Three distinctive stages characterise the shifts in governance that occurred throughout 
the period studied. 
 
Monopoly from 1953 to 1997 
In terms of multiple levels of governance arrangements, centralised governance was in place 
in the period of monopoly from 1953 to 1997 (Zacour, Pereira, Cristofaro, & Ferreira, 2012). 
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Petrobras was created within a nationalist approach to produce oil efficiently and for national 
advantage (Smith, 1972). The main actors were the Federal Government and Petrobras, 
which were organised to support centralised power with monopolistic exploitation, 
production, refining and bulk transport of oil (Dantas & Bell, 2009). Policy was mainly set by 
the Federal Government, and the Law No. 2,004/53 defined the stakeholder position. The 
power base of the actors was also defined in this regulation, which contained the main 
operating rules of the oil sector. This regulation was in place for over 40 years.  
 
With regards to institutional features, Petrobras was created to lead oil exploration, and other 
stakeholders were only indirectly involved (Dias, 2010; Dias & Quaglino, 1993; Smith, 
1972). Petrobras not only represented the country in terms of the oil sector but was also a 
relevant platform for the implementation of government policies at economic and industrial 
levels (Smith, 1972). For example, Petrobras had the goal of expanding national oil 
production and incentivising the use of biofuels to address the oil crisis and the Brazilian 
internal debt crisis in the 1970s (Figueiredo, 2009; Spetic, Marquez, & Kozak, 2012; Zapata 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2009).  
 
During this period, the rules of integration were formal and mainly determined by regulation 
(Dantas & Bell, 2009, Assis & Araújo, 2011). Thus, top-down relations were the dominant 
mechanism of social integration. Petrobras had the monopoly on most oil activities. As a 
result, there was little need for social integration due to an economic and financial centralized 
framework of rules (Surrey, 1987). The wealth generated by the oil sector was decided at the 
highest levels of government, in which oil may have been an instrument for corruption 
(Smith, 1972). 
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In terms of policy content, goals and targets were set either by the Federal Government or 
through regulation. The instrument of policy normally used to set the context was command-
and-control-type regulations (Assis & Araújo, 2011). There was little policy integration, and 
the sectorial approach was the most used. In terms of environmental concerns, the 
environmental agency called the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural 
Resources (IBAMA) was the main instructional body (Mariano & La Rovere, 2007). 
Petrobras needed IBAMA’s previous license to perform activities. The science-policy 
interface was based on selective expert knowledge. Only in the 1970s was offshore extraction 
opened up to international companies, and Petrobras was responsible for administering 
related contracts (Surrey, 1987).  
 
Monopoly abolition from 1998 to 2010 
The governance arrangements in this period were characterised by decentralised governance 
with some aspects of public–private integration. The 1988 Federal Constitution abolished the 
monopoly in the oil sector (Assis & Araújo, 2011). The central government decentralised the 
power to regulate the oil sector among different government bodies. Additional new actors 
emerged in this period. These actors were two governmental organisations: (i) the National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP), which regulated the economic issues within the sector and ensured 
environmental protection, safety in operations and oil resources conservation, and (ii) the 
National Energy Policy Council, which provided assistance in formulating policies and 
guidelines on energy. Additionally, a system of concession areas was established to develop 
exploration and production of oil and natural gas in Brazil. Under this system of concessions, 
organisations that bid the highest in an auctioning system were entrusted with exploration 
areas. The concessionaries assumed all the exploitation risks. These companies also paid 
royalties to the Brazilian Government to compensate for the negative impact produced by oil 
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exploitation and production (ANP, 2007; Assis & Araújo, 2011; Câmarados Deputados, 
2005). Companies from the US, UK, Canada and Australia together make up 48% of 
companies that exploit Brazilian oil (Departamento Intersindical de Estatistica e Estudos 
Socioeconomicos, In English: Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies DIEESE, 
2008). Consequently, under the concession system, most oil revenue would be in the hands of 
the international concessionary companies. Table 2 shows a timeline of the regulatory 
framework for oil exploration noted above. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
In terms of stakeholder position, the Federal Government still played an important role 
(Pereira & Ortega, 2010). However, there was space for more stakeholder involvement 
because ANP was responsible for promoting and organising auctions and assigning oil 
exploration regions to national and international companies. Regarding the policy level, a new 
regulatory framework established new principles and general objectives for energy policy. A 
new Federal Constitution was approved in Brazil in 1988. This document consolidated the 
rights of the Federal Government regarding mineral resources, including subsoil deposits. It 
also established the alternative of hiring private companies to perform oil exploration. 
Consequently, the power base of actors changed considerably. Under the new policy, the 
underground natural resource continued to belong to the Federal Government. However, from 
the moment the oil was brought to the surface, it would become the property of those 
companies that had participated in public auctions. Under this scenario, the concessionary 
companies that extracted oil would be able to commercialise it either internationally or, in 
some cases, nationally (DIEESE, 2008).  
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Regarding institutional features, there is an overlap of indirect stakeholder participation and 
corporatist approach because of the existence of formalised public–private governing 
arrangements by concession areas. In terms of rules of interaction, an important event 
occurred in relation to the distribution of royalties within the exploitation of mineral 
resources on Brazilian soil. Three laws and a decree (Law No. 7,990/89, Decree No. 1/91, 
Law No. 8,001/90 and Law No. 9,478/97) emerged to regulate the economic exploitation of 
mineral resources, water resources for electric power generation, and oil and natural gas, 
respectively. The rates of royalties and special participation addressed in the above legislation 
made it possible for oil-producing states and municipalities to benefit from oil extraction and 
production in Brazil (Brasil, 2000, 2008). The mechanism of social interaction is hierarchical, 
in the sense that the central government sets the rates of royalties, but producing states and 
municipalities in Brazil are autonomous in managing financial resources allocated to them. 
This was a relevant social change because it allowed decentralised wealth distribution. 
 
Policy content, goals and targets for concessions are formally set; however, concessionaries 
also have decision-making power in their activities. Policy instruments used were mostly 
legislation and concessions that were allocated through auctioning. Regarding policy 
integration, there is a sectorial approach to economic aspects, which overlaps with 
concessions and autonomy of states and municipalities to distribute royalties across society. 
However, in terms of environmental aspects, integration was difficult.  
 
The new regulatory agency (ANP) began attempting to address environmental matters after 
deciding the concession areas (Mariano & La Rovere, 2007). During the first years of this 
period, there were no changes in the environmental legislation, although the new regulatory 
agency (ANP) also had responsibility for environmental protection (Mariano & La Rovere, 
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2007). The previous environmental agency (IBAMA) had been founded to use the 
precautionary principle excessively (Mariano & La Rovere, 2007). Moreover, there was a 
lack of official environmental data to assess different areas of the country. Only a few years 
later (in 2002), ANP could resolve this predicament after the credibility of internal systems 
was questioned and challenged by the international markets. The policy-science interface was 
primarily based on generic expert knowledge; however, because of concessions, there was 
also dominance of particular issues, such as specific knowledge on producers and consumer 
relations (Dantas & Bell, 2009).  
 
Pre-salt oil discovery from 2010 to 2013 
The third period analysed followed pre-salt oil discovery, and this phase can be defined as 
having a hybrid governance arrangement. In 2007, two potential oil reserves were discovered 
in Brazil (Petrobras, 2006, 2007). These reserves, called “pre-salt,” lay below a thick layer of 
salt and below the seabed (Petrobras, 2007).  
 
In 2010, the following three new regulations were approved relating to the oil sector: Law 
12,276, Law 12,304 and Law 12,351. Two of these regulations directly influenced actors in 
the sector. The Law 12,276 allowed Petrobras to pursue the exploration and production of oil, 
natural gas and other hydrocarbon fluids. Law 12,304 inserted a new actor called Empresa 
Brasileira de Administração de Petróleo e Gás Natural S.A. – Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA). 
This institution is linked to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and its key purpose is to 
manage the production and commercialisation contracts of the oil that belongs to the Federal 
Government. Thus, in terms of stakeholder position, the central government limited the 
autonomy of the market by designating Petrobras and PPSA as boundary setters. With 
regards to the policy level, the central government, Petrobras and PPSA play important roles.  
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With reference to the power base, the Brazilian Government examined models from around 
the world for granting rights to exploration and production of oil and natural gas (see for 
example Barbi & Silva, 2008; Martins & Loro Netto, 2012; Seabra, Gonçalves, Polette, & 
Casillas, 2012; Silva, 2008). The model used by the Norwegian Government was considered 
the best solution (see for example Barbi & Silva, 2008; Martins & Loro Netto, 2012; Seabra, 
et al., 2012; Silva, 2008). Norway typically enters as a partner of companies operating in the 
petroleum wells, managing the resources. The company’s earnings are invested in a 
Government Pension Fund, which acts as a sovereign fund to be used for pension benefits of 
future generations (Jafarov & Leigh, 2007).  
 
In 2010, Law 12,351 introduced the production-sharing regime, which established that the oil 
brought to the surface would no longer be the property of the concessionary. Only part of the 
oil explored would be given to concessionaries as compensation for the risks incurred while 
carrying out their activities (Assis & Araújo, 2011). Concessions would be based on sharing 
contracts. Petrobras and PPSA would be an integral part of all contracts. PPSA would 
represent the Brazilian Government with regards to management of the oil brought to the 
surface, and it would be responsible for implementing the production-sharing regime (Assis 
& Araújo, 2011; Jacques, Chaves, Veigas, & Freitas, 2009). Petrobras would be responsible 
for managing operations and conducting and executing direct or indirect activities (Assis & 
Araújo, 2011; Gomes & Przybyzesky, 2010). In this scenario, Petrobras could participate in 
auctions. If Petrobras won the auction, then the government would set up a consortium with 
Petrobras as PPSA’s partner in the contract (Assis & Araújo, 2011). If another company won, 
then Petrobras would have to participate at a minimum of 30% in the consortium, with PPSA 
also a partner (Assis & Araújo, 2011). Some authors have highlighted that this new system 
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returns to Petrobras vast control of the Brazilian oil sector, and that Petrobras is operating as 
a quasi-monopoly (Antolín & Cendrero, 2013).  
 
Corruption is a serious issue in a quasi-monopoly. Indeed, a series of scandals related to 
contracts established by Petrobras was recently uncovered (StrategicComments, 2015)13. 
Moreover, to allow Petrobras to actively participate in the new contract system, there was a 
need for government investment (Lamounier & Medeiros, 2012; Sousa, 2011). It was 
estimated that $260 billion would be invested during the period from 2011 to 2015 (Le 
Prioux & Muxagato, 2011). 
 
In analysing institutional features, the model of representation is characterised by indirect 
stakeholder participation overlapping with a corporatist approach, formalising public–private 
arrangements by concessions. There are formal rules of interaction with overlapping 
autonomy of states and municipalities. In terms of mechanisms of social interaction, Law 
12,351 created a social fund in Brazil. This social fund aims to assist social programmes in 
need of help from government revenue to benefit future generations in areas such as 
education, poverty alleviation and technology (Duarte, 2009; Lima, 2009). However, pre-salt 
oil extraction also brought high economic risks, which apparently had not been thoroughly 
considered and included in the regulations in place. Examples of such risks are infrastructure 
costs, negative impacts on the food chain, and political and fiscal challenges (Afonso & 
Gobetti, 2008; Lamounier & Medeiros, 2012; Martins & Loro Netto, 2012).  
 
Regarding the policy content, there are uniform goals and targets for the oil sector; however, 
concessionaries can also influence the production level. Additionally, each state and 
municipality has the autonomy to manage resources obtained from royalties. In terms of 
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policy instruments, the main change was created by Law 12,734/12, which modified the rules 
for distribution of royalties among federal states. The new distribution of royalties promoted 
tension between oil-producing and non-producing states (Brandão, 2013).  
 
Regarding policy integration, the sectorial approach (specific to the oil sector) continued to 
play a relevant role. However, there was an attempt to promote the integration of other 
activities from other sectors. For example, there is still a debate on how to invest resources 
from the social fund to improve social issues, such as education, science and research (IMF, 
2012). There are intentions to allocate part of these rents to increase productivity in the non-
oil sector to avoid ‘Dutch Disease’ (IMF, 2012) and reduce the country’s dependence on oil 
rents. Thus, it is reasonable to state that the policy-science interface is mainly concentrated on 
generic expert knowledge in combination with specific knowledge from concessionary 
companies (Dantas & Bell, 2009) but that there is also an interdisciplinary attempt in terms of 
the introduction of the social fund and investment in non-oil sectors. 
 
The three main shifts in modes of governance identified in the particular case of the oil sector 
in Brazil are summarised in Table 3.  
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
How Did Shifts in Governance Modes Contribute to Sustainable Development? 
The monopoly period can be defined as top-down control by the central government over the 
market and civil society. There was limited engagement14 and collaborative interaction to 
discuss dilemmas involving social justice, human development and the natural environment. 
The negative impact of oil wealth distribution on the social dimensions is normally associated 
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with the lack of an adequate legal framework, accountability and transparency (Marcel, 2013; 
Okoye, 2012). This leads to corruption associated with deviation of oil rents for personal gain 
(Marcel, 2013; Okoye, 2012). Corruption is a common problem of high incidence in Latin 
American countries. One of the main challenges is to appropriately use the wealth from the 
oil sector for human development purposes.  
 
The period after the monopoly abolition reflects changes in features; however, these changes 
were concentrated on economic aspects of oil sector operations. Environmental aspects were 
practically neglected at the initial stages. Later in this period, environmental considerations 
were driven by market forces because the absence of environmental criteria for oil 
exploitation began to pose a risk to external investment (Mariano & La Rovere, 2007). The 
structural modifications offered more power to non-state actors, which is considered an 
alternative to reduce corruption and improve public services (Okoye, 2012). However, the 
unbalanced power provided to actors linked to economic aspects reflected a prioritising of 
financial considerations over the natural environment. Social aspects also began to be 
discussed with debates around protection of property rights and oil rent distribution. The 
literature on sustainable development stresses that wealth distribution should be planned 
through social consensus (Alvarez, 2010; Aydin, 2012; Okoye, 2012; Valdivia, 2008; 
Valdivia & Benavides, 2012), avoiding political criteria (Alvarez, 2010), which tend to 
increase income inequalities (Aydin, 2012). The Brazilian case shows progress towards a 
more planned distribution of oil rents. However, changes in this area were slow, with the oil 
rents initially distributed only among oil-producing states and municipalities.  
 
During the post-monopoly period, there was also debate on the negative impacts caused by 
the increasing dependency on international partners (Acha & Cusmano, 2005; Baxter, 1999). 
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This was mostly because MNCs and domestic businesses control a large portion of 
developing economies, having increased their control over capital and technology (Schneider, 
2009). Additionally, employees (who in developed countries may signify a rich source of 
social integration and driver of change) in developing countries are subject to high levels of 
turnover because of low levels of education (Schneider, 2009). This generates weak trade 
union associations and little collective bargaining power, making labour relations highly 
politicised and state controlled (Schneider, 2009). Consequently, modes of governance 
favouring a more decentralised approach should be carefully implemented in developing 
economies to avoid exacerbating inequality. In the specific case of Brazil, Petrobras is a 
MNC and state-owned firm that not only controls significant amounts of labour and capital 
but also wields significant political influence. For example, recently, Petrobras has been 
utilised as a major part of Brazil’s offensive against the financial crisis. The Government also 
tends to control the price of oil to contain inflation (Cruz, 2016). The fact that Petrobras is a 
MNC can call into question its pure interest in furthering national objectives (Ribeiro & 
Novaes, 2016).  
 
The period after the pre-salt oil discovery was driven by discussion on the regulation of pre-
salt oil extraction and how to achieve the best outcome in terms of economic gains and how 
to distribute them. The distribution of oil rents changed to include non-producing oil states 
and municipalities. A social fund was instated to promote human development; however, its 
effectiveness remains unproven (IMF, 2012). In addition, in this period, Petrobras took back 
a considerable proportion of oil activity, increasing the intensity of nationalistic protection. A 
higher level of government investment in the oil sector was required, compromising the 
application of economic resources to actions that would support sustainability, such as the 
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development of renewable sources of energy (Borba, et al., 2012; Goldemberg, Schaeffer, 
Szklo, & Lucchesi, 2014).  
 
The pre-salt period also showed that a centralised structure of power co-existed with non-
state power during the other two past modes of governance identified (Assis & Araújo, 
2011). Petrobras, as a state-owned firm, was the backbone of this structure of co-existence of 
public and private power (Ribeiro & Novaes, 2016), which allowed flexible movements to 
empower and disempower non-state actors. In line with Driessen, et al. (2012) and Paz 
(2015), it is possible to infer that in the case of the Brazilian oil sector, modes of governance 
did not completely replace one another but rather were built on the basis of previous 
structures (Assis & Araújo, 2011). Thus, if the evolution of modes of governance depends on 
past structures, a more radical change may require Petrobras’ involvement.  
 
The literature notes that changes in modes of governance are more likely to occur when there 
is a failure (or shock) in the features of governance (Driessen, et al., 2012). The recent series 
of corruption scandals related to Petrobras probably signify a need for reflection because they 
call for scrutiny of power structures and actors to prevent mistakes similar to those in the 
past. A governance form that tends towards centralisation does not enable sufficient dynamic 
flow between actors to solve societal problems. Indeed, a new bill 131/2015 is being 
discussed by the Brazilian congress. The proposal is that Petrobras not be required to 
participate in all contracts for oil exploitation. This bill has been suggested to address 
economic difficulties in which Petrobras is operating at the moment after the recent 
corruption scandals.  
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Economic interests seem to be driving, once again, possible new changes in governance. This 
article proposes a more ambitious approach in which Petrobras would intervene to promote a 
rationale towards social and environmental development as opposed to overconcentration on 
economic interests. This would prompt broader involvement of and participation by more 
balanced actors. A possible alternative change in modes of governance would require, for 
example, more transparency in Petrobras operations and management. Petrobras could also 
achieve deeper social integration by empowering employees and increasing engagement with 
groups of social representation, such as trade unions. Moreover, there is a high potential for 
Petrobras to drive significant changes to ameliorate environmental impacts. Petrobras has 
already shown its relevance to these efforts in its development of the use of biofuels in Brazil 
in the 1980s (Hira & Oliveira, 2009).  
 
 
Final Comments 
 
This research provides two different but complementary contributions to the literature on 
governance in the Brazilian oil sector. First, it explores differences in modes of governance 
over a 60-year period. Second, it analyses how the changes in modes of governance can be 
associated with (un)sustainable practices. These analyses not only contribute to the literature 
on governance but also help explain how the features of different modes can contribute to 
sustainable development. The findings of this research report on a very specific context of the 
Brazilian oil sector, and future research in this area could explore modes of governance in 
other Latin American countries. Despite this limitation, the Brazilian oil sector context 
represents a unique scenario, and our results can help inform policy makers about possible 
ways to enhance Brazilian oil sector governance to further sustainable development. This is 
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particularly important in the current Brazilian context because the Government has been 
discussing changes in regulation after the Petrobras corruption scandals.  
 
Another relevant contribution of this study is the application of a framework that structures 
characteristics of different modes of governance at the meta-level by analysing policies, 
actors and institutions. This coding instrument not only provides a measure of the time 
horizon of changes but also illustrates how policies, actors and institutions could relate to 
(un)sustainable practices in different modes of governance. This article reports on analyses of 
archival data considering a time horizon from 1953 to 2013. Hence, another interesting 
possibility for future research is to apply the framework to explore how governance may 
change after the Petrobras corruption scandals. Another possible avenue for future research is 
fieldwork exploring how Petrobras has responded to these scandals and the role that new 
policies will have in driving sustainable development in the Brazilian oil sector context. The 
results would contribute to the debate on how a particular governance feature can adapt and 
influence the evolution of a governance mode after a disruptive event. 
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Table 1: Sources of archival data 
1. Archival material from organisations 
N Sources Type 
 
Description  
1 ANP Technical note Models of contracts for the exploitation and production of oil 
and natural gas n.21/2007 
2 BNDES Magazine Article on oil revenue and taxes v.15/2008 
3 BNDES Report Title: ‘O BNDES em um pais em transição’, v.17, which 
considers challenges in the oil and gas sector 
4 Brazilian Congress Magazine The pre-salt's challenges, notebook series of high studies n. 5 
5 Brazilian Congress Report Challenges in the pre-salt (n.5/2009) 
6 Brazilian Congress Report Legal framework for mining of Brazilian reserves of oil and gas 
(n. August/2008) 
7 Brazilian Congress Report Challenges, impacts and management of pre-salt exploitation (n. 
November/2008) 
8 Brazilian Congress ASLEGIS The pre-salt’s regulatory framework approved by the chamber 
of deputies (n.38/2009) 
9 Brazilian Congress ASLEGIS Pre-salt’s concessions and Petrobras capitalisation (n. 
Fevereiro/2011) 
10 Brazilian Government Regulation Decree n. 1/1991 
11 Brazilian Government Regulation Law n. 2,004/1953 
12 Brazilian Government Regulation Federal Constitution 
13 Brazilian Government Regulation Law n. 7,990/1989 
14 Brazilian Government Regulation Law n. 8,001/1990 
15 Brazilian Government Regulation Law n. 9,478/1997 
16 Brazilian Government Regulation Law n. 12,734/2012 
17 Brazilian Government Regulation Constitutional Amendment n.9 
18 Brazilian Government Recommendations Recomendação nº 001/08/GABRO/PRDF/MPF 
19 Brazilian Government Porta Brasil - 
Webpage 
Economic impacts of pre-salt’s discoveries (10.10.2014) 
20 Brazilian Senate Discussion paper Evaluation of regulatory framework for pre-salt (n.64/2009) 
21 DIEESE Technical note  Brazilian energy matrix n.43 
22 DIEESE Technical note  Oil and gas discoveries in Brazil n.71 
23 EPE Report Brazilian energy balance 2012, Year 2011 
24 Folha de São Paulo Newspaper Investigations by the Federal Police on oil exploitation 
(16.08.2008) 
25 Folha de São Paulo Newspaper President Lula’s speech (06.09.2009) 
26 Folha de São Paulo Newspaper Losses of oil royalties put at risk Rio de Janeiro’s finances 
(18.03.2013) 
27 IMF Staff consultation Statement by the Executive Director for Brazil (article IV/2012) 
28 IMF Working paper Alternative fiscal rules for Norway (n. 07/241/2007) 
29 IPEA Discussion paper Study on royalties (n.1412/2009) 
30 IPEA Communications Inequality, poverty and politics of revenue (n.155/2012) 
31 O Globo Newspaper Criticism on the social fund (07.09.2009) 
32 O Globo Newspaper Petrobras finds oil in pre-salt at Campos Bazin (08.06.2007) 
33 Petrobras Magazine Petrobras background (1993) 
34 Petrobras Report Social and environmental balance 2006-2008 
35 Petrobras Report Sustainability report 2009-2013 
36 Petrobras Notes to investors Discoveries under salt's layer (29.03.2007) 
37 Petrobras Report Annual reports 2006-2013 
38 Rio de Janeiro’s 
government 
Annual report Report for the department of environment 2011 
39 World Bank Economic 
premise 
Pre-salt oil discoveries n.113/2013 
2. Archival material produced by Brazilian academia 
Journal articles (25); books (07) and conference papers (03). 
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Table 2: Regulatory framework timeline from 1953 to 1997 
 
1953 1988 1989 1990 1995 1997 
Law N. 2,004 
 
Federal 
Constitution 
 
Law N. 7,990 Law N. 8,001 Constitutional 
Amendment 
N. 9 
 
Law N. 9,478 
Petrobras holds 
monopoly 
Mineral 
resources 
belong to 
Federal 
Government 
Basis for 
calculation of 
distribution of 
royalties 
Sets new basis 
of calculation 
of royalties 
End of Petrobras' 
monopoly 
Petroleum Law 
Creation of 
ANP 
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Table 3: Timeline matrix for governance changes 
 
 
Period Key Events  
External and Internal Contexts 
 
 Type of 
Governance and rationales 
 Key Outcomes: (i) actors; (ii) institutional; (iii) content features 
 
Monopoly 
1953-1997 
External  
• Dictatorship in which wealth 
generated by the oil sector was 
distributed by the central 
government. 
• Existence of corruption. 
 
  Centralised governance with high levels of 
protectionism. Petrobras was created to pursue 
national interests, for example, to overcome 
the oil crisis in the 1970s and turn Brazil into 
an independent oil producer. 
  Actors 
• Central government agencies coordinate 
exploitation and allocate resources received 
from it. 
• Policy is established at (supra) national level 
under coercion and authority. 
Institutions  
• Formal rules in a top-down format of 
command and control. 
Content 
• Centralised goals and targets within sectorial 
approach. 
• Use of expert knowledge for issues related to 
oil. 
 
Internal  
• Monopolistic exploitation, 
production, refining and bulk 
transport of oil. 
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Monopoly 
abolished 
1998-2010 
External  
• Decentralised power to regulate oil 
sector. 
• Oil rents distributed to producing 
states and municipalities. 
  Decentralised governance with some aspects of 
public–private integration. Idea that 
competition drives not only changes in the oil 
sector (e.g., modernisation of the sector) but 
also advantages for consumers (e.g., lower 
prices) and society (e.g., wealth distribution). 
  Actors 
• High likelihood of stakeholder involvement. 
• Participation of the government at its 
various levels of aggregation. 
• Concessions allow private sector to exploit 
and produce oil. 
Institutions 
• Top-down, command-and-control approach 
allowing some autonomy for sub-national 
government (e.g., states and municipalities) 
and interactions with different other types of 
stakeholders (e.g., governmental agencies 
and private companies). 
Content 
• Centralised goals and targets for 
concessions system combined with targets 
set by specific actors (e.g., government 
agencies, producing states and 
municipalities and more freedom for private 
exploitation). 
• Use of not only generic knowledge but also 
specific knowledge implemented by 
concessionaries. 
 Internal  
• System of concessions. 
• Foreign companies carried out 
48% of oil exploitation. 
• Royalties paid by companies to 
cover impacts of oil exploitation 
and production. 
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Pre-salt oil 
discovery 
2010-2013 
External  
• Petrobras is operating as a quasi-
monopoly. 
• Oil rents distributed to all states 
and municipalities. 
  Hybrid governance arrangement, in which 
indirect stakeholder participation overlaps with 
corporatist approach, formalised by public–
private contract arrangements. There is a sense 
of nationalism in which the oil belongs to the 
society; therefore, all states and municipalities 
are entitled to benefit from it. Social wellbeing 
is also discussed (e.g., social fund). 
  Actors 
• High likelihood of stakeholder involvement. 
• Participation of the government at its 
various levels of aggregation. 
• Sharing contract involves private sector in 
oil production and exploitation. 
Institutions 
• Authoritative rules for production-sharing 
regime set at (supra) national level; 
however, this system also allows lower 
levels of government participation (e.g., 
Petrobras and PPSA) and private sector 
engagement. 
Content 
• Targets and goals set in a centralised manner 
within the production-sharing regime and 
contracts managed by Petrobras and PPSA. 
•  Relevant changes in wealth distribution 
allow transdisciplinary attempts to promote 
social integration. 
 Internal 
• Production-sharing regime. 
• Concessions are based on sharing 
contracts, and Petrobras is 
participating in all of them. 
    
Sources: Adapted from Driessen et al. (2012), Miles and Huberman (1994) and Thompson (1990) 
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Table 5: Abbreviations and acronyms 
ANP Agência Nacional do Petróleo (In English: National Oil Agency) 
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank 
DIEESE Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos (In English: 
Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies) 
EPE Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (In English: Organisation of Research on 
Energy) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPEA Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (In English: Institute of Applied 
Research in Economics) 
ASLEGIS Associação dos Consultores Legislativos e de Orçamento e Fiscalização 
Financeira da Câmara dos Deputados (In English: Association of Legislative, 
Budgetary and Fiscal Economic Consultants from the Brazilian Congress) 
PPSA Empresa Brasileira de Administração de Petróleo e Gás Natural – Pré-Sal 
Petróleo S.A. (In English: National Petroleum and Gas Enterprise and 
Management) 
IBAMA Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (In 
English: Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) 
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1	This is because sustainable development implicitly requires changing the role of the state to 
2 In 2014, Petrobras achieved R$ 26.6 billion in net profit (http://www. 
investidorPetrobras.com.br/en/financial-results/). The Brazilian government owns 50.26% of 
Petrobras’ common shares (http://www.investidorPetrobras.com.br/en/governance/capital-
ownership/). The board of directors contains 10 members, and 7 of them are appointed by the 
Brazilian government. 
3 	Examples of possible impacts that pre-salt oil exploitation can cause on sustainable 
development were clearly highlighted in the literature, and these impacts can be classified 
into three main areas: (i) environmental: risks of environmental disasters, greenhouse gas 
emissions, damage to the ecosystems, etc; (ii) social: unfair distribution of oil rents 
(corruption) as well as long-term social dependency on oil rents and (iii) economic: negative 
impact on some economic activities such as fishery and tourism, need of infrastructure to 
accommodate the migration of specialised personnel who will work in oil exploitation, 
necessity of investments in specific technology to exploit oil in pre-salt geographic layer, 
committing resources to renewable energy, etc. (Costa, 2012; Gonçalves & Granziera, 2012; 
Lamounier & Medeiros, 2012; Polette & Seabra, 2013). 
4	The analysis in our paper identifies real-life situations that link modes of governance and 
(un)sustainable outcomes. According to Lange et al. (2013), studies that highlight 
(un)sustainable practices are rare but essential to illuminate new forms of governance that 
may accommodate better sustainable development initiatives. 
5 This is because sustainable development requires policy integration to promote innovation 
through a dynamic type of governance, which allows multiple actor interaction over a variety 
of levels (Kemp et al., 2005). 
6 Global justice and human development, in this study, can be interpreted as an improvement 
of human well-being and equalising of wealth distribution, e.g. health care improvements, 
better levels of education and poverty reduction (Okoye, 2012).  
7	Lange et al. (2013) analysed three conceptualised modes of governance, including the one 
suggested by Driessen et al. (2012). Lange et al. (2013) mentioned that researchers should be 
clearly informed that these conceptual arrangements are ideal formats and not a fixed set of 
classifications. Thus, conceptual arrangements may change depending on the context 
analysed, and hybrid arrangements formats may emerge. Lange et al. (2013) also suggested, 
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as future research, for example, that new interpretations on governance arrangements should 
improve the justification of features that characterise a particular governance mode to 
simplify classifications. Despite these limitations, Lange et al. (2013) found that the 
frameworks analysed meant a significant development to interpret the ‘complexities of 
governance arrangements’. Moreover, the use of these frameworks to study real-life contexts 
was also considered by Lange et al. (2013) as a very useful analysis to understand the 
characteristics of modes of governance that can best promote sustainable development.	
8 The five modes of governance suggested by Driessen et al. (2012) are simple representation 
of real social arrangements. These five modes of governance are ‘archetypical descriptions’ 
for analysis purposes (p.148). 
9	The selection of secondary data was based on Lustick (1996) who recommended the search 
for data to be based on ‘facts’ to test a theory/framework of interest. This procedure allows 
scientists to organise the data into categories that can explain differently a sequence of 
events. The fact that scientists are not confined to a specific fixed set of rules to collect 
secondary data supports the development of a theory/framework, giving meaning to a 
sequence of events rather than reproducing stories. In sum, Lustick (1996) suggested that 
narratives should be constructed and not merely discovered, and thus, researchers can and 
should demonstrate ‘self-consciousness’ in the data selection to test theories/frameworks, 
allowing the development of the existent knowledge. 
10  Academic material produced in Portuguese was also considered as a source of data. This is 
because the material selected presented an interpretive and/or critical approach (Richard & 
Bettner, 1997). There is evidence that an interpretive and/or critical approach encourages 
reflection, creating knowledge in the form of a narrative. Thus, it can be inferred that science 
is a form of a narrative that contains many stories (Czarniawska, 1997) 
11	The pre-salt discovery is relevant to the Brazilian context because it is one of the largest oil 
deposits in the world (Petrobras, 2006, 2007). The forecast is that the pre-salt oil reserve will 
produce around 15 billion oil barrels with an extra potential reserve that can reach 
approximately 50–100 billion oil barrels (International Monetary Fund IMF, 2012). This 
large amount of oil can drive deep changes in the political agenda of the country, influencing 
governance arrangements. According to Cohen (1995), presidential rhetoric can give a clear 
indication on changes in public’s agenda because the more a president emphasises a political 
area, it is more likely is that the public will react to it, increasing public concerns on the topic. 
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12 This method allows the qualitative analysis of a narrative, using themes that already exist in 
the literature. For example, this article uses the framework suggested by Driessen et al. 
(2012) to analyse the narrative of the data collected. 
13 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-31775677 and 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-32329517. 
14 As given in Table 3, this period mostly coincides with the military dictatorship in Brazil, 
and thus, top-down decisions were more frequent. Evidence of the impacts of military 
dictatorship on sustainable development is well discussed in Brazil. See, for example, the 
following link: http://www.encontro2014.sp.anpuh.org/simposio/view?ID_SIMPOSIO=1773 
	
